onyx-tasks/AUDIT.md

Onyx Project Audit

Date: 2026-04-06 Scope: Full codebase audit for quality, simplicity, security, and maintainability Codebase: ~5,047 lines Rust + Svelte 5 frontend across 5 crates/packages

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Executive Summary

Onyx is well-architected with clean separation of concerns, a solid storage abstraction, and thoughtful security defaults (HTTPS-only WebDAV, zeroized credentials, path traversal protection). However, the audit identified 67 findings across security, data integrity, code quality, and testing. The most critical issues are: missing path validation in sync operations, non-atomic file writes risking data corruption on crash, a logic bug in task reordering, and zero CI/CD infrastructure.

Findings by Severity

Severity	Count	Key Examples
CRITICAL	5	Path traversal in sync, reorder logic bug, no CI/CD
HIGH	12	Non-atomic writes, incomplete move_task rollback, no file size limits
MEDIUM	25	Swallowed errors, missing input validation, accessibility gaps
LOW	25	Code duplication, magic numbers, minor inefficiencies

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1. Security

1.1 CRITICAL: Path Traversal in Sync Operations

Files: sync.rs:603, 622, 702, 715

The sync module joins remote paths directly to the local workspace path without validation:

let local_path = workspace_path.join(path.replace('/', std::path::MAIN_SEPARATOR_STR));

If path contains ../, it could write files outside the workspace directory. The storage layer has robust path traversal protection (storage.rs:154-172 with canonicalization checks), but the sync module bypasses it entirely.

Recommendation: Add canonicalize + prefix check before all file operations in sync:

let local_path = workspace_path.join(&path);
assert!(local_path.starts_with(workspace_path));

1.2 HIGH: No File Size Limits on Downloads

File: webdav.rs:116-133

get_file() downloads entire files into memory with no size limit. PROPFIND responses are correctly capped at 10MB (MAX_PROPFIND_BYTES), but actual file downloads are unbounded. A malicious or compromised WebDAV server could cause OOM.

Recommendation: Enforce a configurable max file size (e.g., 10MB) on get_file().

1.3 HIGH: No Input Size Limits

Files: storage.rs, models.rs, Tauri commands

No maximum length enforced on task titles, descriptions, or list names at any layer. A 1GB task description would be fully buffered in memory during read, write, and sync operations.

Recommendation: Add const MAX_TASK_SIZE: usize = 10_000_000 and const MAX_TITLE_LENGTH: usize = 512 with validation at the storage boundary.

1.4 MEDIUM: WebDAV URL Not Validated at Save Time

File: Tauri set_webdav_config command

WebDAV URLs are saved to config without validation. HTTPS enforcement happens in webdav.rs:28-31 at connection time, but a user could save an HTTP URL and not discover the error until sync. Additionally, empty domain from a failed URL parse could create a catch-all keychain entry.

Recommendation: Validate URL format and HTTPS scheme at save time.

1.5 MEDIUM: Workspace Paths Not Validated in Tauri

File: Tauri init_workspace, watch_workspace commands

These commands accept arbitrary paths from the frontend without server-side validation. A malicious frontend call could target system directories.

Recommendation: Validate paths are within user home directory or explicitly allowed locations.

1.6 LOW: CSP Allows unsafe-inline Styles

File: tauri.conf.json

style-src 'unsafe-inline' is set, which allows inline CSS injection if a DOM-based XSS exists. Acceptable for a desktop app but could be tightened.

1.7 Security Strengths

• HTTPS-only enforcement for WebDAV (credentials never sent in plaintext)
• Zeroizing<String> for all credential fields with platform keyring storage
• Path traversal protection in storage layer (blacklist + canonicalize + prefix check)
• PROPFIND response capped at 10MB
• 30s request timeout, 10s connect timeout
• quick-xml streaming parser immune to XXE and billion-laughs attacks
• No header injection or URL injection vulnerabilities found
• No unsafe code blocks anywhere in the codebase
• No XSS vectors in Svelte frontend (no {@html} usage found)

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2. Data Integrity

2.1 HIGH: No Atomic Writes

Files: sync.rs:462, 289, 671, 684 | storage.rs:250, 315, 423, 526, 557 | config.rs:117

All file writes use fs::write() directly. If the process crashes mid-write, files are left in a corrupted partial state. This affects:

• Sync state (.syncstate.json) — corrupt state silently resets, losing all sync metadata
• Offline queue — corrupt queue silently resets, losing queued operations
• Task files — partial writes produce unparseable markdown
• Config — app config lost on crash during save

Recommendation: Use atomic write pattern everywhere:

fn atomic_write(path: &Path, content: &[u8]) -> io::Result<()> {
    let temp = path.with_extension("tmp");
    fs::write(&temp, content)?;
    fs::rename(&temp, path)?; // atomic on most filesystems
    Ok(())
}

2.2 HIGH: Multi-Step Operations Not Transactional

Files: sync.rs:676-688, storage.rs:314-322, storage.rs:518-526

Several operations involve multiple file writes that can leave inconsistent state on partial failure:

• Conflict recovery (sync.rs): Overwrites local file, creates duplicate, updates metadata — crash between steps loses data
• write_task (storage.rs): Writes task file then updates metadata — crash between leaves orphaned file
• rename_list (storage.rs): Renames directory then writes metadata — crash between makes list inaccessible

2.3 MEDIUM: Sync State Corruption Silently Resets

File: sync.rs:454

serde_json::from_str(&content).unwrap_or_default()

If .syncstate.json is corrupted, it silently resets to empty state. The next sync will re-upload everything, potentially overwriting newer remote data with stale local data. Should warn the user.

2.4 MEDIUM: Concurrent Access Not Protected

No file locking mechanism exists. If two processes (or multiple devices via shared filesystem) access the same workspace simultaneously, data corruption is possible. The Tauri layer uses a Mutex for in-process safety, but no cross-process protection exists.

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3. Logic Bugs

3.1 CRITICAL: Task Reorder Index Calculation Bug

File: repository.rs:88-106

metadata.task_order.remove(current_pos);
let new_pos = new_position.min(metadata.task_order.len());
metadata.task_order.insert(new_pos, task_id);

After removing at current_pos, all indices shift. The new_position parameter refers to the original index space, but insertion happens in the shifted space. Example:

• List: [A, B, C, D], move B (pos 1) to pos 3
• After remove: [A, C, D]
• Insert at min(3, 3) = 3: [A, C, D, B] — correct by accident
• But: move C (pos 2) to pos 1 → remove: [A, B, D] → insert at 1: [A, C, B, D] — correct
• Edge case: move A (pos 0) to pos 2 → remove: [B, C, D] → insert at 2: [B, C, A, D] — user expected [B, C, A, D]... actually correct

The logic may work for most cases due to min() clamping, but the semantics are ambiguous — does new_position mean "insert before this index in the original list" or "insert at this index in the new list"? This should be explicitly documented and tested for all boundary conditions.

3.2 HIGH: Incomplete move_task Rollback

File: repository.rs:76-85

pub fn move_task(&mut self, ...) -> Result<()> {
    let task = self.storage.read_task(from_list_id, task_id)?;
    self.storage.write_task(to_list_id, &task)?;
    if let Err(e) = self.storage.delete_task(from_list_id, task_id) {
        let _ = self.storage.delete_task(to_list_id, task_id); // rollback
        return Err(e);
    }
    Ok(())
}

If write_task partially succeeds (file written but metadata not updated) and then delete_task fails, the rollback delete_task on the destination may also partially fail. Task could end up in both lists or neither.

3.3 MEDIUM: Unwrap That Can Panic in Production

File: storage.rs:393

let (_, task) = entries.into_iter().next().unwrap();

After the deduplication loop drains all but one entry, this unwrap should always succeed. But if the entries vector is somehow empty (e.g., all files unreadable), it panics. Should use .ok_or_else(|| Error::InvalidData(...)).

3.4 LOW: O(n^2) Deleted File Detection in Sync

File: sync.rs:775

for path in sync_state.files.keys() {
    if !local_files.iter().any(|f| f.path == *path) { // linear scan per key

Should use a HashSet for local file paths.

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4. Error Handling

4.1 HIGH: Errors Silently Swallowed

Multiple locations silently ignore errors with let _ =:

File	Line(s)	What's Ignored
sync.rs	268	Queue backup creation failure
sync.rs	284	Queue file removal failure
sync.rs	684-685	Listdata metadata write failure during conflict recovery
storage.rs	390	Stale file deletion during dedup
Tauri commands	various	watch_workspace errors logged to console only
Svelte	SettingsScreen:29	loadCredentials error completely swallowed with .catch(() => {})

Recommendation: At minimum, log all swallowed errors. For data-affecting operations, propagate errors to the user.

4.2 MEDIUM: Error Type Loses Context

File: error.rs

The Error enum uses String for most variants (Serialization(String), WebDav(String), Sync(String)). This discards the original error chain — serde_json::Error line/column info, reqwest::Error kind, etc.

No source() implementation, so error chain traversal is impossible.

Recommendation: Consider thiserror crate or structured error variants with context fields.

4.3 MEDIUM: Sync State Corruption Not Reported

File: sync.rs:454

Corrupt sync state file is silently replaced with empty default. User loses all sync metadata with no notification.

4.4 MEDIUM: Frontend Error Messages Are Raw Backend Strings

File: app.svelte.ts (14+ locations)

All error handling is error = String(e), showing raw Rust error messages to users. No user-friendly error translation layer.

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5. Code Quality & Simplicity

5.1 HIGH: Overly Large Files

File	Lines	Recommendation
sync.rs	1,221	Split into sync_state.rs, sync_actions.rs, sync_engine.rs, conflict.rs
storage.rs	925	Extract frontmatter.rs, dedup.rs, metadata.rs
webdav.rs	775	Extract propfind.rs, credentials.rs
TasksScreen.svelte	667	Extract drawer, header, drag-drop into components
TaskDetailView.svelte	419	Extract subtask section, menus, date picker integration

5.2 MEDIUM: Hardcoded Magic Numbers

Constants scattered throughout without named definitions:

Value	Location	Purpose
10 * 1024 * 1024	webdav.rs:103	PROPFIND response cap
Duration::from_secs(30)	webdav.rs:7,39	Request timeout (defined as const but also hardcoded)
Duration::from_secs(10)	webdav.rs:40	Connect timeout
usize::MAX	storage.rs:404	Unordered task sentinel
1	storage.rs:52	Default task version
.md, .listdata.json, .onyx-workspace.json	scattered	File extensions/names repeated as string literals

Recommendation: Define all as named constants.

5.3 MEDIUM: Duplicated Frontend Logic

• Date formatting duplicated in TaskItem.svelte, NewTaskInput.svelte, TaskDetailView.svelte
• Menu click-outside handlers duplicated in TasksScreen.svelte and TaskDetailView.svelte
• Error handling pattern (error = String(e)) repeated 14+ times

Recommendation: Extract to shared utilities/composables.

5.4 LOW: Unused Dependency

wiremock 0.6 is in onyx-core dev-dependencies but not used in any tests. Should either be used for WebDAV integration tests or removed.

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6. Testing

6.1 CRITICAL: No CI/CD Pipeline

No .github/workflows/, no Makefile, no pre-commit hooks. Nothing prevents broken code from being committed.

Recommendation: Add GitHub Actions with:

• cargo test (all platforms)
• cargo clippy
• cargo fmt --check
• cargo audit (security)
• Frontend lint/build check

6.2 HIGH: Test Coverage Gaps

107 tests total — good for core logic, but major gaps:

Category	Status	Gap
Core business logic	Good (93 tests)	Edge cases missing
WebDAV network ops	Not tested	wiremock imported but unused
Async/sync engine	Not tested	No #[tokio::test] found
CLI commands	0 tests	Entire crate untested
Tauri commands	0 tests	All commands untested
Frontend	0 tests	No component or integration tests
Security	0 tests	No path traversal, malformed input, or auth failure tests
Concurrent access	0 tests	No race condition tests

6.3 MEDIUM: Tests Only Cover Happy Path

Existing tests verify correct behavior but rarely test:

• Network failures and timeouts
• Corrupted/malformed files
• Boundary conditions (empty lists, max-length strings, unicode edge cases)
• Partial failure and recovery
• Concurrent modifications

6.4 Specific Missing Test Cases

sync.rs:

• Path traversal attempts in remote file paths
• Corrupted sync state recovery
• Large file handling
• Network failure during multi-file sync
• Concurrent sync attempts

storage.rs:

• Line 393 unwrap scenario (empty entries after dedup)
• Non-UTF8 filenames
• Symlink handling
• Files exceeding memory limits

repository.rs:

• move_task rollback failure scenarios
• reorder_task boundary positions (0, len, > len)
• Circular parent relationships
• Empty task titles after sanitization

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7. Frontend (Svelte)

7.1 HIGH: Sliding Panel State Corruption

File: TasksScreen.svelte

Multiple scenarios can leave taskStack in an inconsistent state:

1. Deleted task in detail panel — taskStack still holds the deleted ID, parentTask becomes null, panel shows empty content
2. List switch with open detail — tasks from old list gone, detail panel shows null
3. Rapid back navigation — state changes during CSS transition can leave panels at wrong positions
4. Sync conflict dedup — may remove the task ID currently in taskStack

Recommendation: Clear taskStack when tasks are deleted, lists are switched, or workspace changes.

7.2 HIGH: Accessibility

• 16 instances of svelte-ignore a11y_no_static_element_interactions across 7 files
• Only 1 aria-label in entire frontend
• No focus traps in modals (Settings, ConfirmDialog)
• No keyboard Tab navigation in menus
• Missing ARIA roles on drawer, menus, and overlay elements

7.3 MEDIUM: No List Virtualization

All tasks rendered as DOM nodes. For workspaces with 1000+ tasks, this will cause performance issues. {#each} loops in TasksScreen.svelte render every task without windowing.

7.4 MEDIUM: Race Conditions in State Management

• triggerSync() can fire while user is editing (no edit lock during sync)
• toggleTask() updates UI optimistically but re-fetches from backend — sync conflicts can show stale data
• Workspace switch doesn't fully reset all component state
• onFocusChanged setup has no .catch() — unhandled promise rejection

7.5 LOW: Double requestAnimationFrame

File: TaskItem.svelte:29-31

Nested requestAnimationFrame(() => requestAnimationFrame(...)) chains can cause jank. Should use a single RAF with proper timing.

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8. Tauri Backend

8.1 State Management: GOOD

The Tauri backend has well-designed state management:

• Dedicated lock_state() helper converts poisoned Mutex locks to errors (never panics)
• No nested locks detected
• Short critical sections
• Async operations release locks before .await

8.2 MEDIUM: Method Unwraps in WebDAV

File: webdav.rs:67, 89, 175, 195

reqwest::Method::from_bytes(b"PROPFIND").unwrap()

These are safe in practice (hardcoded valid HTTP methods) but violate defensive coding. Should use .expect("PROPFIND is a valid HTTP method") with justification comments.

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9. Dependencies

9.1 Dependency Summary

Crate	Version	Notes
tokio	1.40	Current, full feature (consider trimming for binary size)
reqwest	0.12	Using rustls-tls (good — no OpenSSL dependency)
serde/serde_json/serde_yaml	1.0/1.0/0.9	Standard, well-maintained
quick-xml	0.36	Current, streaming parser (safe from XXE)
keyring	3.0	Platform-native credential storage
zeroize	1.0	Credential memory safety
tauri	2.x	Current major version
notify	7.0	File watching (feature-gated for mobile)
chrono	0.4	Note: 1.0 specified in onyx-cli but 0.4 in workspace — version mismatch
wiremock	0.6	Dev dependency — imported but not used

9.2 Recommendations

• Run cargo audit regularly (no CI to automate this currently)
• Remove unused wiremock or write WebDAV integration tests with it
• Fix chrono version discrepancy between workspace (0.4) and onyx-cli (1.0)
• No certificate pinning for WebDAV servers — acceptable for general use but worth noting

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10. Prioritized Recommendations

Phase 1: Critical Fixes (Immediate)

1. Add path validation in sync.rs — canonicalize + prefix check before all file operations
2. Set up CI/CD — GitHub Actions with cargo test, clippy, fmt, audit
3. Implement atomic writes — temp file + rename for all state files (sync state, config, metadata)
4. Add file size limits — cap downloads and task file sizes at 10MB
5. Fix or document reorder_task semantics — clarify index behavior, add boundary tests

Phase 2: High-Priority Improvements (Short-term)

6. Stop swallowing errors — log or propagate all let _ = patterns
7. Fix move_task rollback — ensure transactional behavior or document limitations
8. Replace dangerous unwrap at storage.rs:393 — use proper error handling
9. Clear taskStack on state changes — prevent stale panel state in frontend
10. Add WebDAV integration tests — use the already-imported wiremock

Phase 3: Quality & Maintainability (Medium-term)

11. Split large files — sync.rs, storage.rs, webdav.rs into focused modules
12. Extract named constants — replace all magic numbers and repeated string literals
13. Improve error types — add context fields, implement source(), consider thiserror
14. Add accessibility — ARIA labels, focus traps, keyboard navigation
15. Deduplicate frontend code — shared date formatting, menu handlers, error display

Phase 4: Hardening (Longer-term)

16. Add security tests — path traversal, malformed YAML/JSON, auth failures, oversized payloads
17. Add concurrent access tests — race conditions, multi-device scenarios
18. Validate models — enforce invariants (no circular parents, non-empty titles, valid paths)
19. Add frontend tests — component tests for critical flows (panel navigation, sync status)
20. Implement streaming for large files — avoid buffering entire file contents in memory

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Appendix: Files Audited

File	Lines	Tests	Findings
onyx-core/src/sync.rs	1,221	29	15
onyx-core/src/storage.rs	925	26	11
onyx-core/src/webdav.rs	775	14	8
onyx-core/src/repository.rs	459	24	5
onyx-core/src/config.rs	286	14	5
onyx-core/src/models.rs	~100	0	3
onyx-core/src/error.rs	~60	0	2
apps/tauri/src-tauri/src/*.rs	~700	0	6
apps/tauri/src/**/*.svelte	~2,500	0	12
Total	~7,000	107	67